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This year's 20th anniversary of UNCTAD provides an
opportune occasion for reviewing both its achieve-
ments and the nature of the constraints upon its
effectiveness. There is no doubt that UNCTAD has
some real achievements to its credit, in two distinct but
closely interrelated fields. These are, first, the
initiation of new ideas, new concepts and new
approaches to the problems of trade and development
and, second, the negotiation of international agree-
ments or conventions on specific issues.
Negotiations
To take this latter aspect first, a number of path-
breaking steps have been taken as regards the
negotiation of new international agreements. The
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner
Conferences, negotiated in 1974, is now in operation,
with radical changes in the legal framework governing
the shares of developing countries in the shipping of
their foreign trade. The agreement on the Common
Fund for commodities, reached in 1980 after four
years of intensive negotiations, is another landmark,
since although it is considerably emasculated from the
original proposals of the Group of 77, it is none the
less of significance in so far as it will be - when it
comes into operation - the first international non-aid
financial institution not dominated by the developed
countries.
Again in 1980, after more than a decade of
consultations in UNCTAD, a set of Principles and
Rules for the control of restrictive business practices
was finally agreed providing for the first time
internationally agreed means for the control of such
practices, including those of transnational cor-
porations, adversely affecting international trade.
Negotiations in UNCTAD on a Code of Conduct on
the transfer of technology have proved more difficult,
and though the greater part of the Code, after many
years of intensive negotiations, has now been agreed, a
number of issues remain undecided.
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However, in the key fields of commodities, manu-
factures and money and finance - the main issues
involved are touched upon belownegotiations have
proved complex and frustrating. It is difficult not to
conclude that in spite of its negotiating successes,
UNCTAD has so far had only a marginal impact on
the trade and development problems of the Third
World.
Analysis and Policy
UNCTAD has had much greater impact in its other
function - as initiator of new ideas and new policy
approaches. Dr Prebisch's original analysis, as
presented to UNCTAD lin 1964, identified the main
constraints on the development process as arising
from the linkages of the economies of developing, with
those of developed, countries, particularly the secular
tendency of the terms of trade of developing countries
to deteriorate. While this thesis - also associated with
Hans Singer - was strenuously opposed by
'mainstream' economists as well as by government
representatives of Western industrial countries, it did
provide a general conceptual framework which greatly
influenced the 'development dialogue' between rich
and poor countries.
Moreover, UNCTAD's intellectual contribution was
not confined to a general analysis of the constraints on
the development process arising from external
linkages of Third World countries with developed
countries, but extended also to new approaches, and
specific proposals, in each of the main linkage areas.
In the commodity area, for example, in addition to the
Common Fund proposal, already mentioned, there
was the concept of an integrated approach to dealing
with the many-faceted problems of commodity
markets, the proposal for the indexation of
commodity prices to prices of imports into developing
countries and, more recently, the proposal for a new
commodity-related compensatory financing scheme
to compensate for shortfalls in the earnings of
individual developing countries from their commodity
exports. In the field of manufactures, the concept of
special preferences for imports into developed
countries from developing countries was agreed at
UNCTAD II in 1968, although earlier it had been
resisted by developed countries as contrary to the
GATT principle of non-discrimination.
In the important area of international monetary and
financial policy, UNCTAD has played a leading role
in clarifying the issues and in proposing new lines of
remedial action. In the early days of UNCTAD much
stress was laid on the need for a scheme of
Supplementary Financing to support the development
programmes of developing countries which were
threatened by unforeseen adverse changes in real
export earnings; on the adoption of an aid target by all
donor countries and on the creation of a link between
SDRs and additional development finance. Following
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971,
UNCTAD played an important role, even if from the
sidelines, in identifying specific areas and proposals
for a reformed international monetary system. In
more recent years, with the rapid accumulation of
external debt by a large number of developing
countries, UNCTAD has turned its attention to
possible ways and means of alleviating the debt
burden.
In other linkage areas - technology, shipping,
insurance and the least developed countries -
UNCTAD has also been a source of important
initiatives based on new analysis and policy
formulation. In technology, UNCTAD activities have
gone beyond framing a Code of Conduct for
technology transfer to encompass efforts to enhance
the technological capabilities of the developing
countries themselves. In shipping, UNCTAD has been
actively considering the merits of recommending the
abolition of flags of convenience, one effect of which
would be to promote the use of developing countries'
national shipping lines in the carriage of their bulk
export cargoes. In the field of insurance, where
UNCTAD is the sole responsible international body,
much effort has gone into promoting national
insurance markets and developing new regional
reinsurance pools. UNCTAD has also become the
focal point for UN concerns with the trade and
development problems of the least developed,
landlocked and island developing countries. The Paris
Conference of 1981 on the least developed countries,
which agreed a 'substantial new programme' of
financial and technical support for this group of very
poor countries, was one important milestone in a
continuing UNCTAD programme in this area.
Two other policy areas should be mentioned here,
both of which have witnessed UNCTAD initiatives
designed to extend the external economic linkages of
developing countries to new trading partners. The first
relates to trade and economic cooperation between
developing countries and the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe, where UNCTAD has played a useful
role in reviewing constraints and proposing new
action, as well as providing a forum for annual
bilateral consultations on trade matters. The second
concerns the increasingly active field of trade and
financial relations among the developing countries
themselves, where UNCTAD has become the focal
point for the elaboration of interregional action to
promote collective self-reliance.
Over these varied and complex areas, many new policy
proposals have succeeded in coming to fruition.
Many, however, have not - essentially a consequence
of disagreements on the nature of the particular
problem in question and on the need for remedial
international action.
Conflicting Ideologies
These disagreements on a wide variety of specific
proposals for interregional action essentially reflect a
conflict of the theory, or 'paradigm', held by the two
sides in the North-South dialogue. Developed market-
economy countries have tended to invoke the tenets of
neoclassical economic theory in support of their
opposition to international regulation of the 'normal
working of market forces', whereas developing
countries have generally argued that unregulated free
markets work to their disadvantage, so that regulation
is needed to achieve a more equitable international
system.
This latter argument derives in part from the Prebisch-
Singer thesis. If, in fact, the terms of trade of
developing countries are subject to a secular
deterioration - and they have certainly deteriorated
since the mid-1950s - then clearly some action is
required in equity to offset the resulting drain of
resources. Such action has usually been envisaged as
including measures to reduce the fluctuations in
commodity prices (thus putting a 'floor' under the
export prices of developing countries), to improve
access to the markets of developed countries and to
secure a greatly expanded flow of financial resources,
both concessional and commercial, on more suitable
terms.
This equity-type argument essentially envisaged
changes in the mode of operation of the existing
institutions governing economic exchanges between
developed and developing countries. The call for a
New International Economic Order (NIEO) by the
sixth special session of the UN General Assembly in
1974 went further, since this was essentially a demand
by the developing countries for a thoroughgoing
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restructuring of the institutional framework itself,
including 'full and effective participation on the basis
of equality . . . in the solving of world economic
problems'. The underlying assumption of this
approach is that the division of the benefits of
economic interchange between rich and poor
countries must be viewed as a consequence of the
relative bargaining strengths of the two groups, rather
than be left to the 'normal working of market forces'.
Indeed, the 'normal working' of these market forces
must be seen as a reflection of the powerful entrenched
institutional position and bargaining power of
developed countries.
There is little doubt that the main developed countries
saw the NIEO demands as a potential threat to their
dominant position in the international economic
system. This reaction generally explains their
opposition to the various specific proposals for
institutional reform put forward by the developing
countries, both in UNCTAD and in other international
forums. The opposing arguments deployed on some of
the key proposals in UNCTAD are reviewed briefly
below.
With the successive economic crises of the 1970s,
accompanied by a marked slowdown in the rate of
economic growth in Western industrial countries,
together with a sharp rise in the rate of inflation, the
equity argument for a global development strategy
soon came to be complemented by the argument that
measures to accelerate development in the Third
World would also benefit the developed countries,
particularly by resulting in an expansion of demand by
developing countries for imports - particularly of
capital goods - from developed countries. Thus, by
reaching agreement on practical measures to promote
development in the Third World, the international
community would at the same time have taken steps to
assist developed countries in overcoming the economic
recession. This is one aspect of the 'mutual interest'
thesis so elequently presented in the Brandt Report,
and it also formed the basis of the proposals presented
at UNCTAD VI in 1983.
The general argument that the international economic
system can be made to operate more efficiently (by
introducing various forms of intervention to promote
development in poor countries) is not, however, one
which was accepted by the developed market-
economy countries, either at UNCTAD VI or at
previous sessions of UNCTAD. The essential counter-
argument, which follows logically from the premises
of neoclassical economic theory, is that any
governmental intervention in the normal working of
market forces will inevitably result in a misallocation
of resources and in a reduction in real income.
However, it is now widely recognised that the premises
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of the neoclassical approach - perfect competition,
perfect foresight, perfect factor mobility, full
employment, the absence of 'externalities' and an
unchanged original income-distribution - are so far
removed from reality that the theory has little relation
to how the real world actually works. Moreover, the
credibility of this type of counter-argument, when
advanced in international discussions, particularly in
UNCTAD, by representatives of developed countries
has been in question in view of the fact that these same
countries have themselves been actively engaged in
increasingly widespread interventions, by means of
subsidies, fiscal and regional policies, employment
and tariff policies, etc, in their own domestic
economies.
Control of International Organisations
Apart from this apparent clash of opposing ideologies,
which has proved a major constraint in efforts to reach
concrete agreements by negotiation, there is a further,
more political, factor which has had a generally
inhibiting effect. UNCTAD is the only truly
international organisation in the field of international
economic relations to be created as a result of the
demands of the developing countries. The two Bretton
Woods institutions - the IMF and the World Bank
have remained firmly in the control of the developed
countries since their inception, while the negotiating
procedures in GATT revolve around bilateral
negotiations between major trading nations, the
results of which are then multilateralised to other
GATT member countries, so that the developing
countries are essentially on the sidelines. By contrast,
in UNCTAD the problems and needs of the
developing countries are always in the forefront of
discussion so that, in this respect, continual pressure is
placed on the developed countries to respond
positively to them. Moreover, in UNCTAD - unlike
the Bretton Woods institutions - the developing
countries have a voting majority, which is exercised on
particular occasions, though there is a tacit
understanding that agreement should normally be
reached on a consensus basis.
Since UNCTAD as an organisation is not within their
control, the bloc of Western countries generally
oppose proposals which would give UNCTAD any
new operational powers. Particularly in the areas of
money and finance, Western countries firmly insist
that decisions can be taken only in the Bretton Woods
institutions, so that any consensus reached in
UNCTAD - for example on making the SDR the
principal reserve asset, liberalising the 'conditionality'
imposed on IMF loans to developing countries or
extending the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility
- remain merely recommendations with no mandatory
force. Again, the Western bloc has always insisted that
negotiations on reducing trade barriers can be
conducted only within the GATT framework, even
though UNCTAD's terms of reference as approved by
the UN General Assembly cover action to improve
market access.
The Integrated Programme for Commodities
(IPC)
In the case of the ¡PC, however, it was not possible to
deploy the argument that international commodity
negotiations were covered by another organisation,
since UNCTAD is the sole organisation empowered to
conduct such negotiations. Instead, the Western
countries entered into a series of detailed discussions,
consultations and negotiations with the other regional
groups in what proved to be a protracted, complex and
often frustrating process. These negotiations covered
both the establishment of a new international financial
institution, the Common Fund, and the setting up of
new International Commodity Agreements (ICAs).
An Agreement on the objectives, capital structure and
mode of operation of the Common Fund was
eventually reached in June 1980, just four years after
the relevant UNCTAD resolution. It was immediately
evident that the original proposal of the Group of 77
had been very substantially amended. Instead of the
Fund having a central pool of finance with which to
support the buffer stock operations of international
commodity organisations (ICOs), most of its financial
resources are to come from deposits with it by the
ICOs themselves, the Fund being endowed only with a
minimum amount of its own capital. Though the Fund
will be able to borrow additional amounts (eg from
commercial banks), the fact that it has no substantial
capital of its own inevitably diminishes its potential
influence as an independent financial institution.
Moreover, the original proposal that the Common
Fund should itself be empowered to intervene to
support commodity prices in emergency situations
(where no ¡CA was operative) was strongly opposed
by Western countries, and has been omitted from the
1980 Agreement.
That Agreement includes a new element - not part of
the original proposal - consisting of a 'second
window' to finance measures other than stocking,
such as productivity improvement and diversification,
the finance to be raised by voluntary contributions
from governments. Provided that such finance can be
raised in adequate amounts, and is made available to
support national, as well as international, projects (a
point still in dispute), it should prove attractive for
many developing countries.
However, it now seems unlikely that the Common
Fund will in fact be able to play the dynamic and
catalyst role in strengthening world commodity
markets that was originally envisaged, not only
because it lacks its own substantial capital, but also
because the developed market-economy countries
have a 'blocking vote' which they can exercise in
discussions with 'significant financial implications'
and in other important' decisions. There is little doubt
that the more powerful Western countries viewed the
original Common Fund proposal as a potential threat
to their present dominance of world commodity
markets, and that this threat was successfully nullified
by their skilful and determined negotiations in
UNCTAD.
Progress has been even slower, and even more
frustrating, on the negotiation of new ICAs. Since the
IPC resolution of 1976, only one new ¡CA with price
regulation objectives - that for natural rubber - has
been concluded. The delay in establishing the
Common Fund may well have acted as a disincentive
for speedy conclusion to the various ICA negotiations.
So, too, were the technical complexities involved, the
conflict of interests among producing countries, and
between these and consuming countries. A more
pervasive constraint, however, has been the opposition
of the developed market-economy countries to any
significant extension of the principle of international
market regulation. One reason for this has been the
belief that ¡CAs eventually become a means for raising
prices above the trend, though in practice this would
not seem to be a likely outcome since importing
countries would have an equal say with exporters in
determining revision of agreed price ranges.
More generally, the Western bloc's opposition to
price-stabilisation through ¡CAs has been, as
mentioned earlier, on the grounds that this would
interfere with the normal working of market forces so
leading to resource misallocation, and also that price
stabilisation could in certain circumstances result in a
destabilisation of export earnings. Both these
arguments, which can be shown to rest on unrealistic
assumptions regarding initially perfect markets, are in
plain contradiction to those used to justify agricultural
price support in the Western industrial countries
themselves. Though their arguments have lacked
credibility, the developed market-economy countries
have succeeded in blocking the establishment of new
price-stabilising agreements, apart from the
exceptional case of natural rubber, thus reducing still
further the significance of the 'first window' of the
Common Fund as a financing mechanism for
commodity market stabilisation.
Industrial Protectionism
The failure of the developed market-economy
countries to act in their domestic economic policies in
accordance with their professed 'free market'
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principles is even more obvious in the case of the
manufactured export of developing countries
(essentially the 'NICs'). As the manufacturing
industries of these countries have expanded into new
areas, and have increased their competitive edge, so
the main Western industrial countries in recent years
have widened the scope of their protectionist devices
(many of which have been developed outside the
framework of GATT) in view of domestic, political
and economic difficulties.
The economic arguments for structural adjustment
measures to be taken by the industrialised countries
have been made on many occasions in UNCTAD
bodies by the UNCTAD Secretariat, as well as by the
Group of 77. Though such measures may well be more
difficult to implement in a period of recession, such as
the present, it should be remembered that the
adoption by developed countries of protectionist
devices which discriminate against developing
countries goes back to the Long-Term Arrangement
on Cotton Textiles of 1972 - well before the mass
unemployment problems of more recent years.
Though it would be generally accepted that both sides
would benefit - at least in the medium and longer-
term - by a reduction in the level of protection, and
detailed proposals on this issue were under discussion
at UNCTAD VI, no concrete agreements have so far
emerged in UNCTAD. The Western industrial
countries continue to insist that negotiations in this
area can be pursued only in GATT, which helps to
avoid the political pressures in UNCTAD, and allows
them also to maximise their bargaining positions in
negotiations among themselves.
Money and Finance
The detailed proposals of the Group of 77 in
UNCTAD for thoroughgoing reform of the inter-
national monetary system were reflected to an
important extent in the report of the IMF Committee
of Twenty, but these and related proposals fell into
limbo with the sharp rise in world inflation and in oil
prices, and the growing external payments difficulties
of developing countries from the mid-1970s. The main
elements of an international monetary reform seem as
far away as ever, new policies being adopted by the
IMF on an essentially ad hoc basis.
The increasing attention devoted to the external debt
problem led to two new proposals being put forward
in UNCTAD at its fourth session in 1976, the results of
which are a further indication of the resistance of the
Western industrial countries to meaningful institu-
tional change. The first proposal was that immediate
debt relief should be provided for the least developed
and the 'most seriously affected' countries. On this, a
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compromise agreement was reached in 1978 at a
ministerial-level meeting in UNCTAD, under which
donors agreed on a restrospective improvement in the
terms of official debt among poorer developing
countries, though they reserved the right to decide the
modalities and the beneficiaries at their own
discretion.
A second proposal, for the refinancing of commercial
debt on to a long-term basis, found no support from
developed countries, though a third line of approach,
to establish guidelines for the renegotiation of official
debt, proved successful.
Efforts in UNCTAD to achieve an enlarged and more
predictable flow of concessional finance to developing
countries - such as pledging of aid on a multi-year
basis and the use of an international development tax
- have not been welcomed by developed market-
economy countries. The prospects for new aid
mechanisms, such as a development tax, remain
distant, and this may well reflect the implications of
such new mechanisms for the existing institutional
arrangements for aid which remain firmly in the
control of donor countries.
Some Implications
The central point which emerges from this brief, and
admittedly incomplete, review of the UNCTAD scene,
is that it is dominated by a clash of ideologies, and by
an apparent conflict of interests, as between developed
market-economy countries and the developing
countries. Though many arguments have been put
forward to demonstrate, even sometimes to quantify,
the mutual interests of both sides in measures to
promote the development process, the mutual interest
thesis in its various forms has never been accepted by
the more powerful Western industrial countries as a
basis for practical action.
Generally speaking, there seem to be two reasons for
this. First, measures to promote the development of
the Third World which involve international inter-
vention or regulation of commercial markets are
opposed on principle by the Western bloc, or agreed to
reluctantly and with qualifications. Secondly, measures
which involve new operational activities by UNCTAD
itself are also opposed on principle by the developed
market-economy countries, since such activities
would not be under their effective control. These
countries would evidently prefer UNCTAD to remain
essentially a 'talking shop', any (substantive)
innovation action being restricted to the IMF, the
World Bank or other agencies.
In the circumstances, the surprising thing is perhaps
the extent of the success that UNCTAD has, in fact,
achieved over the past two decades, some instances of
which were mentioned at the beginning of this article.
But, by and large, these successes are in fairly
specialised fields. Progress in the central areas of
international development strategy remains 1imited.
What, then, are the implications of this analysis for the
future ofUNCTAD? Clearly, unless a new consensus
approach can be forged, UNCTAD is not likely to
emerge as an effective negotiating forum in which
practical solutions to the underlying problems of the
world economy, particularly those of developing
countries, can be thrashed out. In that situation,
UNCTAD's role would revert essentially to analysis
and clarification of the issues involved, with
negotiations - apart from those on more technical
and specialised issues - tending to be confined to
institutions in which developing countries have a
minority voice. Since UNCTAD is the sole agency
concerned with broad issues of international economic
interaction, having representation of countries of
different social and economic systems as well as of
different levels of development, negotiations in more
restricted forums are unlikely to result in solutions ofa
durable nature. Such a situation would mean, in effect,
the abandonment of the post-war effort to evolve a
genuine global strategy for development.
The alternative would be to attempt to derive a new
consensus in UNCTAD related more closely to the
current and probably continuing - issues of slow
growth and increased instability in the world
economy. There seems little doubt that the cycle of
economic activity in the Western industrialised
countries is greatly amplified by the workings of
international financial and commodity markets. The
resultant swings in commodity prices and in the
availability of international liquidity from the private
banking sector can, and often do, seriously damage
the economies of developing countries, as well as
exacerbating inflationary pressures in developed
countries during price booms, thus making economic
management in those countries much more difficult.
The 'mutual interest' argument for promoting Third
World development, namely that this would have a
beneficial feedback on developed country exports now
needs to be complemented by a parallel argument that
measures to support commodity prices in a recession
(or, more generally, to reduce the instability of
commodity markets), together with complementary
measures to ensure a smoother and more predictable
flow of international financial resources, would also
reduce the instability of the world economy itself. A
central function of UNCTAD in the period ahead
could thus be to evolve the intellectual basis for a new
consensus on the key issues of the world economy and
of the needs of the development process in the context
of the much more sombre prospects for the decade to
come.
However, to proceed from the evolution of such an
intellectual consensus to practical action requires also
a recognition by developed country policy-makers
that the advantages of mutual interest policies are
likely to outweigh the disadvantages, as perceived by
them, of a reduced role in the management and control
of the international economic system.
Though there is little sign of such recognition at
present, and therefore of significant negotiations on
key development issues being pursued in the near
future, in the longer term much will depend on the
degree to which developing countries take steps
themselves to enhance their economic strength,
including their mutual economic linkages, and thus
increase their collective bargaining power. The
intensification of economic cooperation among
developing countries (a detailed programme for which
is currently under consideration in UNCTAD), will
thus be of strategic importance in the longer term in
negotiating structural and institutional change in the
international economy.
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